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Abstract
The legacy power grid has several limitations resulting in misuse and mismanagement of energy. The evolution of IT technologies
have empowered revolutionizing the power grid and created the concept of the Smart Grid. Hence, the Smart Grid is considered
as the integration of the latest information, communication and operational technologies with the traditional power grid in order to
enhance energy management within a reliable, eﬃcient network linking the diﬃrent grid actors from the consumer to the end-head
system such as energy providers and billing services. Introducing new technologies into Smart Grid raises new issues, mainly
security issues. Therefore, in this paper, after presenting the Smart Grid and the smart metering system, we present the security
requirements of the Smart Grid and we highlight the user privacy concern as well as the diﬀerent techniques proposed in literature
to deal with it. Our main objective is to provide a study of the existing techniques preventing privacy disclosure.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Providing energy to residential and industrial areas is among the most important requirements of modern society.
Therefore,the energy management cycle must be carefully and accurately planned. Traditionally, manual meters
are used to read consumption and are consulted periodically by special agents in order to perform billing. Such an
inaccurate operation may lead to diﬀerent errors and misuse of energy, in addition to the inconvenience for inhabitants.
Therefore, it is useful to introduce smart meters which are able to communicate appropriately their consumption
information to involved parties. The deployment of a smart metering system is beneﬁcial to the whole power grid as
it represents an important factor for energy management optimization.
Combining new technologies with the legacy power grid may introduce new challenges regarding its security.
Mainly, it is assumed that once revealed smart meter readings may disclose private information about customers’ daily
life and habits. Recently, in Australia and Canada, a rapidly growing movement has been opposing the installation
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of new sophisticated meters. Smart meter opponents have chosen to retain their old analogic ones despite utilities’
intimidation tactics. The disclosure of their own privacy is topping their concerns. Therefore, it is highly required to
investigate in how to preserve the customer’s own privacy while taking advantage from the use of new technologies in
the power grid. Few research works have been launched in this context aiming to conceive eﬃcient privacy-preserving
protocols that ﬁt with the Smart Grid features.
In this paper, we ﬁrstly give an overview of the Smart Grid and its diﬀerent domains. Then, we compare the Smart
Grid to the Internet as it is a potential network on which we could build the smart grid. We, also, brieﬂy present the
smart metering system. After that, we move to introducing the Smart Grid security requirements. A special focus is
given to privacy in the Smart Grid. We identify the eﬀect of revealing smart meter readings on the user’s privacy. And
then we present few techniques dealing with privacy-preserving requirement.
2. An overview of Smart Grid
The smart grid is the modernized version of the electrical grid. It uses the recent information, telecommunication
and operational technologies to improve and optimize the traditional power grid. Smart Grid has several objectives.
Mainly, it opts for automating and optimizing the operations of the electrical grid, in particular, energy transmission
and distribution, data collection, billing, etc. Besides, via the adoption of ﬂexible tariﬀ policies, the accuracy of meters
readings, the reliability, transparency and real-time delivery of messages, it aims to reduce the consumption costs and
to optimize the management of energy. Self-healing capabilities is also an important requirement to be guaranteed in
Smart Grid.
2.1. The Smart Grid domains
According to NIST1, the Smart Grid involves seven diﬀerent blocks called domains which are bulk generation,
transmission, distribution, operation, market, customer, and service provider (Fig.1).
Fig. 1. Smart Grid domains
• Bulk generation: This domain is responsible for the generation of electricity in bulk. Generated electricity could
be immediately distributed or stored for later distribution. Electricity resources could be either non-renewable
1 National Institute of Standards and Technology
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(like oil and coal) or renewable (like water, wind, sunlight, etc.). The bulk generation domain is connected to
diﬀerent other domains such as transmission and market domains.
• Transmission: Electricity is transmitted to the distribution domain via multiple substations and transmission
lines.
• Distribution: This domain is responsible of delivering energy to the consumer domain according to user de-
mands and energy availability.
• Operation: In this domain, the movement of electricity is managed in order to ensure an optimal and eﬃcient
transmission and distribution of electricity.
• Market: In this domain it is about balancing between the supply and the demand. Actually, this domain may
contain diﬀerent actors: electricity is provided by suppliers to traders who resell it to retailers who in turn
distribute it to the consumers.
• Customer: The consumer is the end user of the energy; it could be either home (Home Area Network; HAN)
or an entire building (Building Area Network; BAN), a private, commercial or industrial user. In addition to
consuming energy, an end user could also store and generate energy via home installed equipments such as
photovoltaic cells. The customer domain is also referred a smart metering system or also Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI). End users communicate with the diﬀerent domains in order to reveal their consumption
details, to perform billing and to forecast future consumption. Communication between this domain and the
other domains is usuallly controlled by SCADA1, a technology of monitoring and controlling large processes.
• Service provider: Services such as billing, system control, energy management, account management, etc. are
provided by the service provider domain. It interacts with the diﬀerent other domains in order to ensure the
smooth management of the Smart Grid.
2.2. Smart Grid vs. Internet
In order to eventually establish future cooperation between Smart Grid and Internet, it is important to evaluate
the diﬀerent similarities and diﬀerences in term of requirements in both networks. Obviously, both structures are
complex and hierarchical, yet, in term of requirements, both networks are fundamentally diﬀerent. In fact, in the
case of internet, what matters the most regarding performance is to guarantee high throughput and fairness between
users2. However, when it comes to Smart Grid, it is about guaranteeing a secure, reliable and real time delivery
of messages while the real time monitoring and management of the system is not required. Regarding traﬃc, the
Internet usually provides best eﬀort traﬃc with about 100 ms of delay required for delay-sensitive traﬃc such as VoP
traﬃc. On the other side, in the Smart Grid, traﬃc ﬂows are mostly periodic transmitting consumption related data
between end users and utilities. Besides, its time requirements are more stringent as some kinds of messages delivery
is constrained by 3 ms delay. As for the communication pattern, it is commonly known that Internet adopts the end-
to-end model of communication while the Smart Grid supports a two-way communication model bottom-up (from
meter to utilities) and top-down (from utilities to meter) and possibly peer-to-peer model in customer local networks.
And unlike the Internet that uses the IP protocol suite for communication, the Smart Grid needs more sophisticated
protocols guaranteeing mainly the low energy and low data rate requirements such as the IEEE 802.15.4g for the PHY
layer3.
Certainly, the Internet oﬀers solutions enabling large-scale network deployment. The Smart Grid as one of these
networks could be an eventual exploiter for Internet but some features must be revisited regarding time, security and
law data rate/low energy requirements. Such requirements could be highlighted when focusing more on the customer
domain: the smart metering system. In the next section we give an overview about the smart metering system features.
2.3. The Smart Metering System
The smart metering system, also called as the AdvancedMetering Infrastructure (AMI), is the sensor network of the
Smart Grid. Small and smart devices, gas, water and electricity meters, are installed in the end user side (residential
and commercial buildings) in order to automatically sense and record accurate special data related to users energy
consumption (energy consumption, time of use, etc.). Recorded data is then delivered to related utilities repeatedly
(each minute, hour, billing period, etc.). Eventually, meters communicate their sensed measurements to a gateway
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that gathers all the sensed data in the local area network and forward it to the outsider network. The local network
bounded by the gateway is called Home/Building Area Network.
On the inside of this local network, the communication between the diﬀerent devices is performed wirelessly for
ﬂexibility reasons. The smart devices used in the local network are battery-powered and have low computational
capabilities, therefore this wireless communication should meet the requirements of low energy and low data-rate.
Such a system stands for automating ﬁne-grained readings enabling the adoption of ﬁne-grained and dynamic
time-based pricing schemes. Thereby, the smart metering system is a crucial factor for the power grid management
allowing the consumer to be more active and aware in the management of the energy consumption and able to take
better-informed decisions when planning its use of energy.
2.4. Security requirements in Smart Grid
Providing secure and reliable delivery of messages is considered of high priority in the Smart Grid. Hence, to
ensure such a critical information exchange in this network, it is important ﬁrst to deﬁne the security requirements of
the Smart Grid2.
Availability is among the main security requirements. Actually, it is important to ensure a constant and continuous
correct functioning in the Smart Grid by preventing any delay in delivering messages and any system disruption that
may causes failure in delivering energy. Besides, access to and use of information have to be reliably and timely
ensured.
Integrity is considered as another security requirement of high importance. In fact, any malicious unauthorized
modiﬁcation of information may lead to incorrect billing operations or incorrect power management decisions.
Conﬁdentiality, the last important security requirement to mention, requires that unauthorized access to proper
information and its disclosure to third parties should be prevented. In this context, it is assumed that disclosing
information such as daily energy consumption by illegitimate third parties invades the user personal privacy.
Privacy, among others, is topping user’s concerns as it is inconvenient to let third parties keeping an eye on its daily
life details. In the remaining of this paper, we focus on the privacy concerns, and the diﬀerent techniques proposed in
literature to preserve it from disclosure.
3. Privacy
3.1. Privacy concerns
It is important ﬁrstly to deﬁne the term privacy in Smart Grid. Overall, privacy in Smart Grid is keeping the power
use information of users out of the reach of other third parties in order to prevent disclosing the user living proﬁle.
In the smart metering system, smart meters are the key element responsible of two-way communication between the
consumer and the utilities, allowing the exchange of data related to pricing as well as consumption related information.
Due to its automated and ﬁne-grained nature, The data issued from a smart meter may reveal a lot about the user
activities and behaviour when exposed to sophisticated data mining techniques. Possible extracted information could
be:
• Energy consumption details
• Number of people in the house
• Residents presence or absence in the house
• Daily schedule (showers/ watching TV/ sleeping patterns)
• Information about household equipment
• Movement pattern inside the home in case of smart homes
Fig.2 shows a day-long electrical power usage trace extracted from a smart meter. A simple and intuitive observa-
tion allows as to learn several information about a consumer day-long activity. From the high variation of the curve
we can deduce human activity in the house, and linking time with variation make it possible to deduce what are the
activities being performed by the end user. It is possible with data mining techniques and power signature analysis to
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have more accurate information about its activities. Certainly, many end users won’t tolerate under any circumstance
the disclosure of theis living proﬁle to any third party.
Fig. 2. Example of day-long power trace
Such behavioural information may interest diﬀerent third parties such as social studies researchers as they can have
an overview about people daily habits, security agents can use information for conducting criminal investigations or
resolving legal disputes. It is also of high importance for criminals as they may pre-identify household items to steal as
well as detect the absence of residents from home and then schedule their burglary. Therefore, it is of high importance
to adopt powerful privacy preserving techniques to secure the smart metering system and protect the consumer daily
life patterns from invasion.
3.2. Privacy preserving techniques: study and comparison
Many researchers have tackled the privacy issue and proposed diﬀerent techniques to preserve the consumer privacy
in the Smart Grid. Privacy preserving techniques could be divided into two categories; those using data aggregation
and those without data aggregation. In Smart Grid, and to deal with the security issue, data aggregation is deﬁned as
gathering and computing data in order to preserve the anonymity of its origins. Aggregated data could be originated
from diﬀerent sensors, or it could be diﬀerent readings from the same sensor. And in Smart Grid literature, such
operation is usually computed in the gateway level and linked to other security techniques.
• Techniques with aggregation are usually locally centralized as we have a gateway that communicates with
diﬀerent smart meters before forwarding the aggregated data to the utilities. Besides, usually here the security
logic is processed in the gateway level alleviating the smart meter from extra computational capabilities. But,
the aggregator could be considered as a local single point of failure that may cause the disconnection of the
local electric network if the aggregator fails.
• Techniques without aggregation are usually distributed, where smart meters communicates directly with the
utilities. In this case, each smart meter is reinforced with extra computational capabilities allowing it to perform
the security techniques on its side.
We have compared the studied approaches from a security perspective as well as computational costs perspective. We
noticed that the aggregation techniques pose an availability concern as the aggregator represents a local single point
of failure which may lead to a system disruption and failure in delivering messages and energy.
Most of the privacy preserving techniques may be aﬃliated under one of those two categories. In the remainder
of this paper, we present several techniques of each category and then we draw two summary tables for comparison
between them.
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3.2.1. Privacy-preserving techniques using aggregation
Aggregation is often adopted in smart grid networks for diﬀerent purposes; mainly to reduce the number of packets
travelling between the AMI and utilities avoiding bandwidth exhaustion. But, in our study we are interested in the
case where aggregation is used as a way of privacy preservation.
Several researches have coupled data aggregationwith other privacy preserving techniques.In4, authors assume that
data issued from smart meters are multidimensional and could be classiﬁed into space related data and time related
data. Therefore, they introduced the notions of space based aggregation and time based aggregation and then the
Privacy-Preserving Nodes (PPNs) which play the role of aggregators collecting data from the diﬀerent smart meters.
In this work, data aggregation is used along with the Secret Sharing technique5. Secret Sharing is a cryptographic
algorithm based on the idea of dividing a secret into shares that will be distributed among a group of parties. No one
can reconstruct the secret unless it disposes of at least a deﬁned number of shares. In this work, the meter readings are
considered as secrets that will be divided and shared with diﬀerent PPNs. PPNs perform homomorphic aggregation
over received shares and then forward aggregated data to requesting consumers. The proposed architecture is locally
distributed as aggregation is performed in diﬀerent nodes which enable easy healing of the system in case of failure
of nodes. Besides, the model is fault-tolerant as the initial shared information could be obtained even if some nodes
which number is inferior to a certain threshold are compromised.
In6, authors propose the use of Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proof protocols along with aggregation. Zero-Knowledge
proofs allow one party to prove to another the correctness of a statement without revealing anything about the state-
ment other than its veracity. Molina-Markham et al. used a zero-knowledge billing protocol allowing the smart meter
to compute the bill and prove to the utility service that it is in conformity with the power consumption that remains
unknown to it. A neighbourhood gateway periodically send an aggregated value of the neighbourhood consumption
for future demand forecast and electricity generation planning. The proposed solution guarantees correct billing with-
out unveiling customer energy consumption details to third parties. However, the technique is expensive in term of
computational costs, it requires high computational capabilities to be granted to the Smart Meter.
Homomorphic cryptosystems also are widely used in security protocols mainly when using aggregation, especially
because of their homomorphic additive and multiplicative proprieties i.e. the encryption scheme is additively homo-
morphic if the multiplication of cipher texts of n messages results in an encryption of the sum of these n messages.
In7, Lu et al. used the homomorphic Paillar system to encrypt communication between smart meter and utility center.
Encrypted data is aggregated in intermediate aggregators that ignore the real value of the encryptedmetering data. The
solution proposed by Lu et al. could be considered as eﬃcient in term of computational costs while guaranteeing that
no third party would disclose the content of data travelling between the Smart Meter and the utility center. Security is
provided in an end-to-end mode.
3.2.2. Privacy-preserving techniques without aggregation
When there is no gateway to aggregate data, we often resort to a third party that we consider as trustworthy. Such a
trusted third party would be the only allowed party to identify the data origins and bind between them. Smart metering
data are anonymized. In8, authors diﬀerentiate between high and low frequency data and attribute an ID to each type;
High Frequecy ID (HFID) and Low Frequecy ID (LFID). It is assumed that high frequency data could reveal diﬀerent
information about the end user when analysed with eﬃcient techiques, mainly its life patterns and behaviour could
be easily deduced. Therefore, they propose that such data, i.e. its HFID, should only be known by the trusted third
party. However, low frequency data, i.e. data with LFID, could be known by all parties. Hence, data issued from
smart meters keep anonymous to any untrusted parties including the utility center. To ensure the correctness of data,
the connection between a valid HFID/LFID could be veriﬁed via the third trusted party.
In9, authors use another technique to preserve the privacy of consumers in Smart Grid: the blind signature. The
blind signature is a scheme that allows a person to get a message signed by another party without revealing any infor-
mation about the message to the other party. Here, it is about blindly signing anonymous power credentials (authors
used credential identities instead of user identity) used for daily power requests. Daily power consumption remains
anonymous, user identity is only used at the end of each billing period when presenting all consumed credentials
together.
In10, the proposed technique aims to preserve the consumer’s own privacy by the smart meter itself in the user
side; the approach is referred to as user-centric privacy-preserving approach. The idea is that the only involved
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communicating parties are the smart meter and the control center and they are the only ones that have the ability to
get real reading values and match it to real identities. The control center is assumed to be fully trusted and secure. On
the user side, the consumption messages are signed with Hash based MAC2, assigned to pseudo-identities preventing
intermediate substations to invade any meter related information. Then, messages are encrypted before being sent to
the utility center.
The two tables below present a summary and a comparison of the approaches cited above. Tab. 1 veriﬁes some
security features while tab. 3.2.2 shows the evaluation of some performance metrics in each techniques.
Table 1. Security features of the privacy preserving techniques
Privacy preserving Integrity Conﬁdentiality Certiﬁcation
techniques comparison authority
Secret sharing4 Encryption Encryption No
ZK proof 6 Encryption Encryption No
Homomorphic Cryptosystem7 BLS short signature11 end-to-end encryption No
Third trusted party8 Timestamp, nonce, MAC, Encryption, MAC Yes
digital signature
Blind signature9 Double encryption Double encryption No
User centric privacy10 Encryption, HMAC Encryption Yes
Table 2. Performance of the privacy preserving techniques
Privacy-preserving Computational Overhead Scalability
techniques comparison costs/delay
Secret sharing4 N/A N/A Yes
ZK proof 6 Expensive costs N/A No (Smart Meter: prover, the
company server: veriﬁer)
Homomorphic Cryptosystem7 Not expensive Low overhead N/A
Third trusted party8 long setup time N/A N/A
Blind signature9 N/A Depends on N/A
power usage
User centric privacy10 HAM signature 20 bytes (8%)/ N/A
veriﬁcation delay: request message
368msec
4. Conclusion
Privacy in smart metering systems has been a serious concern to the diﬀerent involved parties in the Smart Grid,
mainly end-users. Special analysis of data issued from smart meters may reveal information about life patterns of
users. Therefore, it is important to establish an eﬃcient infrastructure that adopt security strategies guaranteeing the
non disclosure of users private information.
In this paper, we ﬁrst recalled some concepts related to Smart Grid such as domains and security requirements.
Then we gave a special interest to the privacy concern and privacy-preserving techniques. we classiﬁed the privacy-
preserving techniques into two categories on the basis of the use of aggregation: techniques using aggregation among
others to provide privacy preservation and those that don’t use aggregation between the end-users and utilities. For
each categorywe presented three techniques along with their diﬀerent features. Two drawn tables summed up diﬀerent
security and performance features of the privacy-preserving techniques.
2 Message Authentication Code
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It is worth mentioning that the existing research works, as asserted by the drawn tables, lack of in-depth perfor-
mance evaluation of privacy-preserving protocols in terms of real implementation conditions. The Smart meters are
devices of low computing capabilities, battery-powered and to be widely deployed. Hence, privacy preserving tech-
niques should not exhaust meters ressources and capabilities and have to guarantee scalability of deployment. Related
metrics should be carefully evaluated in order to guarantee the reliable and eﬃcient functioning of smart meters.
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